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United They Rose, Divided They Fall:  
The EU and the Economic Crisis 
 
Vanessa Marzo
♦ 
 
In  an  increasingly  globalized  world,  threats  become  ever  harder  to  contain  because  of  their 
easiness to spread. Terrorism, drug trafficking, epidemics, nuclear proliferation, etc. are only a 
few  of  the  countless  threats  that  frighten  civilians  and  nations’  leaders  around  the  globe. 
However,  from  late  2008,  all  eyes  are  focused  on  a  new  pressing  issue  that  has  led  world 
economies into a terrible storm. 2009 began with the unwinding of a major world economic 
crisis, which was placed under a sole spotlight and has attracted the undivided attention of nations 
everywhere. Worldwide, newspaper headlines read: Le Monde: “Sur un nuage”; “La crise frappe 
encore plus violemment les pays pauvres: Le Sud aussi a besoin de plans de relance”; El País: “El 
FMI  pone  cifras  a  la  Gran  Recesión”;  The  Financial  Times:  “Into  the  Storm”;  China  Daily: 
“China injects $38b into Asian crisis fund”. However, the crisis does not only hurt countries 
economically, but also politically and socially. As countries struggle to get their economies back 
on track, they neglect the bonds forged by an increasingly interdependent world and childish 
disputes on “who started it?” and “You fix it” arise. Childish disputes, since ‘what?’ or ‘who?’ 
caused the crisis are, for the moment, inconsequential subjects compared to ‘What should be done 
to curtail its devastating effects?’ 
Economics is convulsing European politics. Strikes or protests have erupted in the streets 
of Greece, Ireland, France, Germany, Britain, Lithuania, Ukraine and Bulgaria. This spasm of 
unrest was unexpected, since Europeans believed they would be spared the worst effects of a 
disaster carrying a “Made in USA” tag. However, the crisis has spread with a dramatic speed 
giving  way  to  ever  more  gloomy  predictions  for  the  foreseeable  future.  As  president  of  the 
European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, states, “There is no doubt we are living through the 
greatest financial and economic crisis in living memory” (Thornhill, 7). The European Union is 
being stress tested as never before, as its proudest achievements (peace and stability, a single 
market, a common currency and the convergence between west and east) are threatened by the 
economic storm.  
 
Background 
 
With the end of World War II came the dawn of the European Union. The Wars had left an 
instable, shattered and deeply divided Europe, and at the time the idea of its integration seemed 
completely ludicrous. However, by 1947 it had become clear to the United States that if it did not 
act  to  ignite  the  European  economy,  the  communists  would  gain  a  political  grip  in  Western 
Europe. On June 5, 1947 the Marshall plan was born as an effort to revive the European continent 
and foster its reconstruction. The Marshall Plan recipients formed the OEEC in 1948 to engage in 
coordination of aid and related projects (Ginsberg, 44). The Marshall Plan paved the way for the 
Schuman  Plan  and  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  the  driving  engine  of  regional 
integration in Europe.  
After World War II, the Europeans had not only lost influence in the world but were also 
faced with instability at home and countless threats abroad. Jean Monnet, known as ‘The Father 
of Europe’ (Fontaine, 5), thought a collective response was needed. Monnet believed that the 
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Franco-German problem represented “the greatest obstacle to a united Europe” (Ginsberg, 42), 
and he proposed a solution to the dilemma. Since neither side in the past had felt secure unless it 
controlled all the resources along the French-German border Monnet’s solution was for France 
and Germany to exercise joint sovereignty over their coal and steel resources (42). Although the 
ECSC  was  an  idea  originally  conceived  by  Jean  Monnet,  French  Foreign  Minister  Robert 
Schuman proposed the establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community (Fontaine, 5). On 
April 18, 1951 Benelux, France, Italy, and West Germany signed the Treaty of Paris  -based on 
the Schuman Declaration- and so the economic community was born. The treaty spelled out a 
deliberately  vague  political  program  to  achieve  peace  and  prosperity  through  economic 
interdependence (Ginsberg, 46). The ECSC provided for majority voting, a characteristic that 
allowed it to stimulate further regional integration in the 1950’s (42,Ginsberg).  Without a doubt 
the ECSC’s greatest accomplishment was to serve as stepping stone for a much larger project in 
European  integration,  which  was  the  creation  of  the  European  Union  in  the  1990’s  (49, 
Ginsberg).  
In 1954, the ECSC’s limitations to serve as the engine for further European integration, 
lead an inspired Monnet to establish the Action Committee for a United States of Europe. During 
these years, political unity was no longer in vogue, as countries’ attention shifted towards the 
development  of  atomic  energy  (Gillingham,  361).  Benelux  proposed  a  plan  based  on  the 
establishment of a customs union for the whole of the ECSC countries. What Monnet saw as a 
new initiative to foster further European integration, countries saw as a welcomed step to develop 
their national economies. On May 1956, the Foreign Ministers approved the Spaak report and the 
six  nations  agreed  to  accept  it  as  the  basis  for  the  Treaties  of  Rome  creating  the  European 
Economic Community and Euratom. The EEC Treaty aimed to establish over time a common 
market. Unlike the vague 1951 Treaty of Paris, whose preamble spelled out the vision of a united 
Europe, the Rome treaties were far less visionary in that they did not explicitly link economic 
integration with the goal of political unity. Twelve years after World War II, governments were 
more eager to integrate economically than to encourage institutionalized political cooperation. 
Moreover, Roy Ginsberg explains in his book –Demystifying the European Union- that,  
The EEC Treaty’s preamble reveals the primacy placed on economic cooperation 
over  political  union,  with  one  exception:  in  the  first  clause  the  Treaty  refers 
implicitly to a political union. However, the rest of the preamble and the Treaty 
focus  on  functional  issues  within  a  new  common  market:  economic  and  social 
progress, improvement in working and living conditions, and economic development 
of backward regions (55). 
 
  The EEC and Euratom Treaties entered into force on January 1, 1958. Which shaped the 
contours  of  today’s  European  Union  and  the  economies  of  the  six  charter  members  enjoyed 
sustained growth and development in the 1960’s and early 1970’s.  
  The 1980s were a difficult period for European integration. The late 1970’s and early 
1980’s was known as the era of Eurosclerosis, which was characterized by massive crises of ‘old 
industries’, such as steel production, the chemical industry and the textiles particularly due to the 
astronomic rise of Japanese and East Asian economic competitiveness (Ginsberg, 78). “Politics at 
the  national  and  EC  levels  responded  with  massive  state  subsidies  and  a  temporary 
encouragement  of  collusive  agreements”  (Resch,  416).  This  period  also  witnessed,  the 
enlargement of the EC from nine members (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Germany, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark) to twelve with the additions of Greece 
in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986 (Gungor, 6). Also, the Single European Act was 
ratified in 1987, it established a new set of policy tasks to create a Single European Market 
through the elimination of existing trade barriers and through liberalization of trade in services 
and capital. Then of course, came the end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991 and with it the 
dawn of new phase of EC development, a phase of widening and deepening of the Union. The  
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collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the EC was now responsible to help Central and Eastern 
European countries to solidify their democratic and market transitions and to stabilize a post-Cold 
War Europe rendering war “materially impossible” (Ginsberg, 80).   
The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 and ratified in 1993 (80, Ginsberg); this treaty 
established the European Union (Fontaine, 9) and gave a detailed outline for the establishment of 
EMU by the end of the decade. On June 1993, the European Council set forth the Copenhagen 
Criteria, which defines the conditions that must be met by any country seeking membership of the 
EU.  Then  came  the  1995  enlargement,  where  Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden  joined  the  now 
European  Union.  From  1987  to  1996  thirteen  countries  submitted  applications  to  join  the 
European  Union.  While  in  1997,  the  Luxembourg  European  Council  launched  the  EU 
enlargement process (Gungor, 6). The Copenhagen European Council of December 2002 found 
that 10 of the 13 candidate countries fulfilled the necessary requirements to become EU member 
states. After 15 years of reform Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia officially joined the EU on 1 May 2004, followed by 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (Past, 1). “For the former communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, the EU membership means a symbolic break with a difficult past, and more 
importantly, political and economic stability in the short run, and prosperity in the long run” 
(Gungor, 7).  
The December 2001 European Council declared the need for a new treaty that could 
“provide adequately for the reforms in EU governmental decision-making needed for a union of 
twenty-five  or  more  states  to  act  efficiently  and  effectively”  (Ginsberg,  84).  Therefore,  the 
European  Council  called  for  a  constitutional  convention  to  convene  in  2002,  where  a  draft 
Constitutional treaty was created, which was presented to the EU Council in June-July 2003 
(Union Europea, 2). The Constitutional Treaty would replace the primary European Treaties for a 
single legal text (3). However, the results of the Dutch and French referenda in 2005 forced the 
European Council to postpone the ratification process for a so-called period of reflection. The 
Lisbon treaty is a new version of the Constitutional Treaty that was rejected in 2005 (del Rio, 
508), only this time its rejection came from the Irish referendum in June 2008 (Deals, 1). 
 
The Economic Crisis 
 
For  the  first  time  since  the  Second  World  War,  the  world’s  rich  economies  have  sunk 
simultaneously into a deep recession. Summer came to an abrupt end in early September when 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two largest US mortgage lenders, became crushed by severe 
liquidity problems and were subsequently nationalized. The problems did not stop there, as Wall 
Street saw its leading investment banks collapse, bought out or turned into retail banks. 
Then, on Monday September 15 2008, the demise of Lehman Brothers fuelled the by then 
global financial crisis. In a matter of days, the world’s financial system came to the point of 
collapse.  Barely  a  day  passed  without  a  large  institution  requiring  a  bailout  or  a  country 
struggling to retain the confidence of its creditors. Consumer confidence was destroyed; in rich 
countries citizens were too scared to spend for fear of losing their jobs or for their failure to 
secure credit. Retailers around the globe were declaring bankruptcy and car sales fell through the 
floor.  While  companies,  for  their  part,  would  not  risk  investment  in  such  a  gloomy  climate 
leading to drop in innovation and GDP growth. 
Critics would argue that the US’ economy would take the most devastating blows from 
the  economic  storm;  however,  as  the  US  is  now  recuperating  from  its  recession  thanks  to 
President Obama’s active and rapid policies the international arena is worried of the permanent 
damages that the crisis will unveil.  
As the Bush administration advocated for a 700 billion dollars rescue plan to bailout 
American banks, in the UK banks were saved only by the government’s promise of taxpayer 
support and guarantees on wholesale funding. Many European banks were also bailed out, while  
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Ireland “guaranteed all its banks’ liabilities to stop a mass run” (Giles, 8). At a ravaging speed, 
the turmoil spread beyond the rich world to crush emerging markets.  
 
The Euro zone 
 
The adoption of the Euro is considered one of the most important steps in European integration, 
second  only  to  the  Schuman  Declaration  announcing  the  establishment  of  the  European 
Community of Coal and Steel (Roy, 17). The common currency is definitely an important symbol 
of the region’s shared sovereignty “over a range of crucially important economic and political 
processes”  (Mulhearm,  1).  However,  what  started  out  as  a  strategy  to  pull  Europe  together 
economically and politically now harms its least fortunate members. 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) entered into force in 1993 and provided for the 
establishment  of  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (Ginsberg,  247).  The  Euro  was  first 
introduced in 1999 as a virtual currency used for cash-less payments and accounting purposes. It 
then appeared in physical form on 1 January 2002 (The Euro).  It is worth noting that the EMU 
does not include all 27 EU member states, at the moment it is comprised of 16 member states. 
Furthermore, the EMU is a monetary union but it is not a full economic union, as the EU does not 
have sovereignty over fiscal policy (Ginsberg, 247).  
With the establishment of the EMU, member states gave up their freedom to print and 
regulate currency, set interest rates and use Monetary Policy to address both periods of growth 
and periods of recession (247). On the other hand, members of the Euro zone also stood to gain 
economically. Without a doubt, some EU members could see the currency’s potential to at some 
point  compete  against  the  US  dollar  in  the  international  arena  (Landon,  1),  which  made  the 
establishment of the EMU that more appealing for EU member states. However, politics played a 
greater role in the adoption of the Euro than economics. 
The Economic Monetary Union strengthened the internal market. It “eliminated the costs 
of  converting  currencies  in  the  exchange  of  goods  and  services  for  its  member  firms  and 
consumers, and ended the uncertainty of fluctuating exchange rates among its members who trade 
within the internal market” (Ginsberg, 247). Under the Maastricht Convergence Criteria, in order 
for a member of the EU to become part of the Euro zone, their national budget deficits must not 
exceed 3 percent of GDP; total national debt must not surpass 60 percent of GDP; exchange rates 
must stay within the ERM range of fluctuations for at least two years; inflation cannot be more 
than 1.5 percentage points higher than the three lowest inflation member states of the EU; and 
long-term interest rates must not be more than 2 percent above the average of the lowest three 
performers (Ginsberg, 249).   
Consequently, in the 1990s many member states made arduous efforts, through fiscal 
tightening, wage restraint and product and labor market reforms, to qualify under the Maastricht 
Convergence Criteria for euro membership (High, 37). However, once accepted into the Euro 
zone they relaxed, fooled by the notion that membership would be a panacea to their problems. 
Instead, countries should have pursued more vigorous national reforms to make their economies 
better able to compete with Germany’s; and they should have tightened fiscal policy to offset the 
euro’s easier monetary policy (High, 37). 
Today, Europe (and the world) is in a deep recession. In Spain and Ireland property 
bubbles that were inflated in part by the switch to low euro interest rates have burst. In Greece, 
Italy and Portugal a steady loss of wage competitiveness is eroding growth. In all five countries, 
as budget deficits grow, worries that public finances may arrive to an unsustainable path are 
rising exponentially.  
The rules of the single currency forbid any bailout of one country by the center or by 
other member states. The Germans fear that they will be asked to pay for the recklessness of 
others and on March 1, Germany rejected a rescue plan of several thousand million Euros for 
Eastern Europe (Verhaegen, 10). Nevertheless, Germany, as euro area’s biggest economy and  
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biggest  exporter,  would  suffer  most  from  any  member’s  default.  That  need  not  imply  a 
straightforward  bailout;  however,  it  would  imply  both  a  bigger  role  for  the  center  and  more 
intrusive monitoring of euro members’ budgets (High, 37).  
In  Frankfurt,  the  ECB,  the  EU’s  independent  Central  Bank,  sets  interest  rates  and 
monitors the money supply in the Euro zone. One grave concern with the ECB’s supranational 
power is the uniformly set interest rates for the whole of the EU, mainly, because of the economic 
differences among its 27 member states. The uniformly set interest rates do not comply with the 
needs of all countries alike, since these needs widely vary across borders. In the present economic 
crisis many Euro zone member states –such as Spain, Slovakia, and Greece- need liquidity in 
order to stimulate their economies. However, the ECB will not increase the money supply in the 
Euro zone because countries –like Germany- that do not need the extra liquidity will be affected 
by a devastating rise in inflation. 
Nevertheless,  for  a  decade,  the  EMU  has  brought  major  benefits  in  terms  of  price 
stability, new investment opportunities and more efficient markets. The young currency has also 
proven to be a powerful shield against external economic shocks. However, today, the euro faces 
the first recession in its history and, in the words of Joaquin Almunia, “there is no question this 
year will be a stress test for the European single currency” (Almunia, 1). Thus, while Euro zones’ 
poorest members gained from sharing a currency with some of the mightiest economies in the 
world, with the present economic crisis membership seems more like a burden to these countries 
since the rules of membership are keeping them from implementing policies to “ride out the 
economic storm” (Landon, 1).  
The current economic crisis hit central and eastern Europeans so disproportionately hard 
for  two  major  policy  errors  by  their  respective  governments.  The  first  was  to  encourage 
households to obtain mortgages in foreign currencies. While the second policy mistake was that 
the new EU members treated euro zone membership as a voluntary policy choice, which is clearly 
a misinterpretation of their own accession treaties. Of course, the new members were not under 
an  obligation  to  join  the  euro  zone  immediately,  but  they  were  obliged  to  conduct  policies 
consistent with eventual membership. The decision to procrastinate their integration into the euro 
zone has “turned out to be a financial stability disaster” (Munchau, 1). These are problems that 
the  euro  zone  cannot  choose  to  overlook,  mainly,  because  most  eastern  European  banks  are 
branches of western European banks. According to l’agence de notations Moody’s, banks from 
Austria, Germany, Italy, France, Sweden, and Belgium account for 84% of banks in Eastern 
Europe. (Le Monde, 1). Economists from the Dresdner bank said that eastern European currencies 
are trapped in a depreciation spiral, which for the euro “is like a bomb with delayed-action” (Le 
monde, 1). 
Certainly, membership to the Euro zone is not a panacea for a country’s social and 
economic problems but in times of crisis the ESCB must act to protect the Euro zone from a 
catastrophe, and in order to do that it must help eastern European countries to adopt the Euro. 
Hungary, Poland, along with the rest of the Baltic countries are pleading for the EU to accelerate 
their accession process so they could join the Euro zone as soon as possible (Verhaegen, 10). 
Also, the EU could provide financial aid through the IMF to prevent an economic meltdown in 
the  midst  of  the  present  crisis.  The  ESCB  should  also  reconsider  some  of  its  membership 
requirements and think about bending the rules to make it easier for non-member states to join the 
Euro zone.  
 
The Economic Crisis hits home 
 
 “British jobs for British workers”, “Buy Spanish”, “Invest in France”, “No new iron curtain”, 
these are some of the slogans that resonate throughout the EU. The strain of the economic crisis is 
certainly  opening  up  divisions  within  the  union,  or  in  the  words  of  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Hungary, “the iron curtain” that will divide the European continent between the rich and the poor  
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(Verhaengen, 10). Protectionism is surfacing in Western Europe and state aid rules that avert “the 
promotion  of  national  industrial  champions  are  being  cheerfully  trashed”  (Rachman,  11).  As 
Nicolas Sarkozy urged car companies to invest at home rather than elsewhere in the EU, and 
Spain launched its “Buy Spanish-”campaign. 
President Sarkozy sees the EU as part of the problem rather than the solution naming 
the  27-member  organization  the  “Trojan  horse  of  globalization”  (Thornhill,  7).  The  French 
president,  along  with  other  national  leaders,  have  been  directing  their  own  response  to  the 
financial crisis that infringes state aid and competition rubric while also “trashing the eurozone’s 
fiscal rules” (Thornhill, 7).  
In  Spain,  unemployment  has  reached  15  per  cent.  Spanish  unemployment  is  the 
highest in the euro zone, and it is expected to reach 20 per cent as the recession deepens (New 
Spanish Steps). The rapid rise of Spanish unemployment, mainly from the building sector, along 
with the increase of bad loans on the banking system show the dangers of Spain’s dependency on 
home construction during the last decade. Spain debates between more stimulus for its national 
economy and the protection of its financial markets. Facing a similar situation was Ireland, which 
opted for raising taxes. However, Spanish personal and corporate taxes are already high (New 
Spanish Steps).  
  The  Council  of  the  European  Union  informed  the  public  through  a  press  release  in 
Luxembourg on 27 April that the national budget deficits of Spain, Ireland, Greece, and France 
exceeded 3% of GDP and prompted for immediate action to reduce their deficits by the deadlines 
established by the Council (15).  
  Poland  and  its  currency  initially  avoided  the  worst  of  the  financial  meltdown  in  the 
United States and Western Europe. In late February the zloty stood at 4.73 to the euro, which was 
good news for the Polish. Though, then the Central Statistical Office announced that Poland’s 
industrial production dropped close to 15 per cent in January compared to the same month in 
2008. Which meant that for three consecutive months Poland witnessed a decline in its industrial 
production, definitely signals of an unhealthy economy. The financial crisis threatens Poland’s 
goal  of  adopting  the  euro  in  2012,  but  Poland’s  finance  minister  –Jacek  Rostowski-  told 
parliament that, “Secure public finances and a quick adoption of the euro are the best way out of 
the crisis for Poland” (Lucas,2). While Poland is eager to join the euro zone, Slovakia finds 
membership to be a “double-edge sword” (Cienski, 2). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since  October  2008,  the  European  Union  has  failed  to  recognize  the  economic  crisis  as  a 
European problem rather than national problems. Since then, a stream of unilateral actions to save 
national banks and prop-up structurally flawed industries dominate the economic arena. However, 
for the EU to combat the financial crisis it must implement both short-run and long run measures. 
“It  needs  to  add  short  term  actions  to  its  structural  reform  agenda”,  while  at  the  same  time 
continue to invest in the future (Communication, 5). The policy instruments for dealing with 
employment  and  stimulating  demand  are  mainly  in  the  hands  of  the  Member  States,  but  if 
Member States and the Commission work in unison the results would be much more efficient. 
 
       Some of the policies the EU should implement are:  
  Increasing investment in R&D innovation and Education. Which will lead to a boost of 
GDP growth along with real GDP that will allow countries to avoid a rise in inflation. 
  Enhance European competitiveness by developing an ever greener economy that would 
create jobs in the short-run and would definitely benefit the economies in the long run 
through  the  creation  of  new  technologies  and  the  achievement  of  EU  environmental 
goals. 
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But above all, the 27-member states must put their selfish interest aside and work as a united 
front  to  tackle  the  economic  storm  and  ensure  the  survival  of  the  Union  and  its  greatest 
achievements.  “Protectionism  and  Nationalism  are  close  cousins”  (Rachman,  11).  The  EU’s 
enlargement to include the countries from the former Soviet bloc was an incredible step towards 
spreading political and economic freedom across the Continent. 
     A  lack  of  economic  development  in  vulnerable  economies  will  not  be  the  only 
consequence of a division in Europe during this financial crisis. The Eastern members’ political 
stability  could  very  well  unleash  the  demons  of  the  past,  as  mounting  anger  over  recession, 
unemployment and debt could fuel populism with unpredictable consequences. Some central and 
eastern European countries feel betrayed and excluded by the union as western countries –like 
France-  support  national  solutions  rather  than  the  much  needed  international  solutions,  and 
Germany turns its back on the Eastern bloc. 
The achievements of the European integration process have been remarkable over the 
past 50 years, and indeed strength comes in numbers. If Europe faces this crisis as a sole united 
front it will stand a better chance to survive and to ensure peace and stability throughout the 
continent. However, divided the Union will undoubtedly fall and the consequences would be 
catastrophic.  
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